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OPTIMAL PENALTIES IN CONTRACTS
AARON S. EDLIN* AND ALAN SCHWARTZ**

I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Law
Contract law protects the promisee's expectation interest by requiring a breaching promisor to pay as damages a sum that would put
the promisee in the same position that performance would have.
When the expectation is difficult to monetize, the promisor must
render the contractual performance. The law also permits parties to
specify in their contract the sum the promisor must pay on breach: the
specified sum is permitted to fall below, but cannot exceed, a reasonable ex ante estimation of the promisee's expectation interest. The
rules regulating contractual damage measures, denoted here as the
"liquidated damage rules," thus prohibit penalties.'
It will be clarifying to restate the law with a little formality. Define the damages the law requires a breaching promisor to pay as d;
the promisee's expectation as g; and a "damage multiplier" as a
where 0 _<a< oo. When the law protects the expectation interest with
a damage award, ax = 1 so that d = g. In contrast, an award of specific
performance is enforced by the court's contempt power, so that a
promisor contemplating breach faces a sanction that likely exceeds, in
monetary and reputational terms, the value of the promisee's expectation interest. To be sure, the large penalty this multiplier implies is
not imposed in equilibrium: that is, promisors prefer performance to
bearing the penalty. In practice, the parties' ability to renegotiate
University of California at Berkeley, Professor of Law and Professor of Economics.
** Yale University, Sterling Professor of Law and Professor, Yale School of Management.
This article benefited from comments at the University of Virginia Law School Conference
"The Law and Economics of Contracts," September 2002.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1979); U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1987).
The civil law, in contrast, permits penalties unless they are "extravagant." See Aristides N.
Hatzis, Having the Cake and Eating It Too: Efficient Penalty Clauses in Common and Civil
ContractLaw, 22 INT. REV. OF LAW & ECON. 381 (2002).
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permits a promisor to perform when its cost of performance would be
less than the value of performance to the promisee or, if the cost of
performance exceeds its value, to pay a price for the right to exit.2
Letting ca be the "specific performance multiplier," contract law
therefore contains two multipliers: (x = 1 when the promisor is required to pay money; and (x = o. > 1 if a court orders specific performance and the promisor either performs at a loss or pays an exit
price.
When parties write a liquidated damage measure L in their contract, they are implicitly defining a multiplier 0 k because the contract
requires the breaching promisor to pay damages of a1 g (recall that a
can take any value including one). It is costly for parties to create
damage measures. On the common understanding, parties write
them when it would be difficult to prove to a court the monetary
value of the promisee's lost expectation., As said, the liquidated
damage rules require oq < 1 in expectation: the damages a contract
sets must reflect either a "reasonable" estimate of the gain that
breach would cause the promisee to lose, or less than a reasonable
estimate.
The liquidated damage rules are curious. To see why, let a contract set c1 = oo, so that a breaching promisor would have to pay the
infinite damages of oog. This penalty never would be imposed in
equilibrium because the promisor would choose either to perform at a
loss or to pay an exit price. Thus, an infinite contractual multiplier is
equivalent to a judicial order for specific performance. The initial
curiosity is this: When the promisee's expectation is difficult to
monetize and the contract is silent regarding remedies, the court will
threaten the promisor with a large penalty in order to induce the
promisor either to perform or to make a supracompensatory payment
to the promisee. However, when the promisee's expectation is
difficult to monetize, the parties themselves (through their choice of a
2. To unpack these possibly cryptic sentences, denote the gross value the promisee would
receive from performance as v and the promisor's cost of performance as c. Consider the case
where performance would be inefficient (c > v) and the promisee has paid the price and so is
entitled to a specific performance order. The promisee could not require the promisor to pay a
sum in excess of c in order not to perform because the promisor would prefer to incur the lower
performance cost of c. On the other hand, unless the promisee had no bargaining power at all,
it could require the promisor to pay a sum that while less than c would exceed v. Thus, when
performance would be inefficient, the promisor would have to pay more than the promisee's
expectation to cancel the contract.
3. In the contract theory terms that we will sometimes use, the promisee's valuation is not
verifiable.
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multiplier) cannot threaten the promisor with a large penalty in order
to induce the promisor either to perform or to make a supracompensatory payment to the promisee. Why can courts do what parties
cannot? The other curiosity is that courts do not protect the expectation interest against all contractual encroachments: courts permit
parties to underliquidate damages.
1.2 The Literatureand Our Claims
There was a large law and economics literature concerning the
liquidated damage rules that began in 1977 with Goetz and Scott's
important paper 4 and ended around 1993. This literature focused on
a related curiosity. When parties are sophisticated and externalities
are absent, courts do not review the parties' contractual choices for
reasonableness. The liquidated damage rules, however, require
courts to review the parties' choice of a damage measure for reasonableness. Is this apparent anomaly justifiable? Earlier authors
differed in their answers: some claimed that judicial review of the
contract's damage measure was appropriate5 while others claimed
that a damage measure deserved no more scrutiny than any other
6
contract term.
Scholars agreed that parties had an incentive to write a liquidated damage clause-a contractual damage measure-when a
promisee's valuation would be unverifiable. The literature also asked
what damage multiplier parties had an incentive to write. As we will
see, the answers to this question also differed. Symmetric information models showed that parties would always choose a damage
multiplier that equaled one: contracts, that is, contain damage measures only to ensure protection of the promisee's expectation interest.7
Papers that assumed asymmetric information, however, showed that
parties would choose t, _<1: some buyers, for example, would receive
full compensation on seller breach while other buyers would receive
less than full compensation. Since a buyer who would be undercompensated paid a lower price, these contracts were shown to be effi4. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on An Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977).
5. See, e.g., Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated
Damages, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 147, 148-49 (1984); Paul H. Rubin, Unenforceable Contracts:
Penalty Clauses and Specific Performance, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 241-43 (1981).
6. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 4, at 557-58, 578.
7. See infra Section 2.1.
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cient for the parties to them, in the sense that no party preferred a
contract different than the one it had.' Finally, some papers showed
that when the seller had monopoly power, parties had an incentive to
choose a damage multiplier that exceeded one in order to deter entry
by third parties. 9
While courts likely read few of these papers, the papers' results
make the legal rules more understandable. Courts were willing to
threaten large penalties, in the specific performance context, in order
to prevent inefficient breaches (when the promisor's cost to perform
would exceed the price but fall below the promisee's valuation).
Courts, however, sometimes believed themselves to be observing
damage multipliers that exceeded one. 10 Were an expert asked to
opine, say in 1993, as to the commercial reason for such a multiplier,
the expert would have had to say that the parties intended to erect a
barrier to entry, or that the parties mistakenly chose the wrong
damage measure, or that one party slipped a high multiplier into the
contract in order to exploit the other party's lack of sophistication or
bargaining power, or that there was just no good explanation for the
parties' choice of o > 1. Rules that require courts to refuse enforcement to contractual damage measures with high multipliers seem
justifiable when these multipliers are inefficient, unfair, or inexplicable. Thus, the curious distinction between the specific performance
and the liquidated damage rules appears to have an explanation: in
the specific performance context, the court's penalty promotes
efficiency; in the contractual damage measure case, the parties'
penalty seems not to promote efficiency.
This Paper attempts to make two contributions to the liquidated
damage rule debate. First, it concisely reviews the literature from
1977 to the present to make clear to readers without mathematical
sophistication what the scholars have established regarding contractual damage measures. Second, and of greater importance, it shows
that the liquidated damage rules actually are without justification. In
the early models, neither party invested in the subject matter of the
contract; rather, the models primarily analyzed the parties' incentives
to trade or to breach. The modern models include investment: that is,

8. See infra Section 2.2.
9. See infra Section 2.3.
10. One of us has suggested that the courts often were mistaken. See Alan Schwartz, The
Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for
Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 383-87 (1990). They probably were not always mistaken.
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they ask whether parties can write contracts that will ensure efficient
ex post trade and efficient ex ante investment that would either reduce
the seller's costs or increase the buyer's value (or both). These
models establish an important result: penalties often are necessary to
induce efficient investment. Parties thus could choose damage
multipliers that exceed one for efficiency reasons.
The new results imply that the courts' review of liquidated damage clauses should change. It now is known that parties may choose
high multipliers for bad reasons-to exploit promisors or to deter
entry-or for good reasons-to encourage efficient investment.
Parties also can choose low multipliers (c < 1) for bad reasons-to
exploit a consumer's lack of sophistication-or for good reasons-to
screen efficiently over buyers. Courts therefore no longer should
focus on the size of the contract's damage multiplier: multipliers of
any size can be efficient or inefficient, depending on the function they
were set to serve. The practical implication of this conclusion is that a
promisor no longer should be permitted to defend a suit on a liquidated damage clause by asserting that the clause is a penalty. Rather,
the promisor should be limited to the traditional defenses of unconscionability and restraint of trade.
Part II reviews the early literature. Part III exhibits, in an informal way, the results of the modern contract theory models. Part IV
concludes.
II. THE EARLY LITERATURE
2.1 Symmetric Information Models
The earlier papers were written informally, but a model is implicit in the analysis." The parties were a risk-neutral seller and a
buyer who may or may not be risk-averse. At to, the parties write a
contract to trade a good or offer a service. The contract contains a
damage measure because the buyer's valuation v is assumed to be
observable to the parties but unverifiable to the court. At t', the
seller can take an action that increases the probability that it will
perform the contract. This action was called a precaution. The
papers did not say what a precaution would be. One may think of
ordering spare parts, making a firm contract with a supplier, or the
11. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 4, at 562-68; Rea, supra note 5, at 151-63.
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like. At t2, the seller realizes its performance cost. At t3, the seller
can perform or breach, and at t4 either the buyer pays the price or the
seller pays damages. The papers are unclear, but it appears that the
buyer's valuation is fixed at the start.
The question relevant to us is what implicit multiplier did the
contractual damage measure imply, and the answer was one. As to
why, if the buyer's valuation were not verifiable, a court would award
no damages at all-a multiplier of zero. This multiplier would not
maximize the contractual surplus. To achieve maximization, the
seller must be induced to take the optimal precaution and to perform
when performance would be efficient. Renegotiation would ensure
efficient trade, but the precaution would be inefficient unless the
seller optimized against the buyer's true loss from breach. This loss is
not zero, but rather the buyer's expectation. As a consequence, a
multiplier less than one would yield too little precaution by the
promisor while a multiplier that exceeded one would yield too much.
In addition, a risk-averse buyer would want to insure. The optimal
insurance is full, which also implies both the need for a contractual
damage measure and a multiplier of one.12
These papers showed why parties would write a contractual
damage measure and that, in the absence of unconscionability or
mistake, the damage measure would equal the buyer's expectation.
The claim in some of these papers that courts should not specially
review contractual damage measures seemed something of a non
sequitur, however. If the parties had no good reason to under- or
overliquidate, then a court had no good reason, other than a general
commitment to freedom of contract, to enforce multipliers that
differed from one. But if the argument against special review was
based on a general commitment to freedom of contract, there was no
need to write these papers initially.
2.2 'Asymmetric Information Models
In these models, 3 a seller with market power faces a set of buyers
with valuations for the goods to be sold that range from low to high (v
12. A buyer also could purchase market insurance, but the seller's ability to affect the
performance probability was taken to imply that the seller could offer insurance more cheaply.
If the buyer could also affect the probability of performance, the optimal multiplier might be
less than one. For an informal analysis, see Rea, supra note 5, at 152-55.
13. What follows is based on Lars A. Stole, The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses
in Contractual Environments with Private Information, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 582 (1992). A
simpler version appears in Schwartz, supra note 10, at 377-83.
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{v,,... vhj). A buyer's valuation is a function of his purpose for the
goods or the efficiency with which he will use them. The seller cannot
observe buyer purposes or production functions, so valuations are
private information (that is, they are unknown to the seller). 14 Breach
can occur because the seller is assumed to have an outside opportunity whose profitability becomes known by the time for performance.
The seller will breach when it would do better taking the outside
opportunity and paying damages than it would do performing the
contract.
Because buyer valuations differ and the seller has market power,
the seller would like to price discriminate-to charge buyers prices
that reflect their valuations. It induces the buyers to reveal by
offering buyers a menu of contracts that differ on two relevant terms:
the price and the liquidated damage clause. A buyer thus faces a
tradeoff: the buyer would like to be compensated if there is a breach
but the request for compensation reveals the buyer's valuation; then
the seller can exploit the buyer in the price term. As is perhaps
apparent, the greater the valuation the buyer places on the seller's
performance, the more willing the buyer is to make this tradeoff in
favor of compensation. It can be shown that the buyer with the
highest valuation chooses a contract with a fully compensatory
liquidated damage clause; lower-valuing buyers choose less compensatory liquidated damage clauses at lower prices. 5 The resultant set
of contracts is efficient for the parties given the information structure:
the seller maximizes profits, and each buyer prefers his contract to
any other contract.
The damage multiplier in these asymmetric information models
is less than or equal to one. This is a function of the parties' economic
choices. Precaution is not an issue here, so the only question for the
seller is whether to take her outside opportunity or not (to breach or
not); and the only question for the buyer is how much insurance
against breach he should purchase. Once more, a buyer has no
reason to purchase insurance in excess of his expected loss, so the

14. This assumption implies that valuations are unverifiable.
15. For readers comfortable with equations, the optimal liquidated damage clause, L, is a
function of the buyer's valuation, v, and the value of the seller's outside opportunity, which can
be denoted 0. Then L(v, 0) =v-

F(v)l

The second term is decreasing in v. Thus, F(v) -4 1

lf(v)l
as v -* v,, so the second term disappears; the highest-valuing buyer gets a liquidated damage
clause that equals its valuation v. Lower-valuing buyers get lower liquidated damage clauses.
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high valuers have no reason to want, nor does the seller have a reason
to offer, a multiplier that exceeds one.
The equilibrium in these models does not necessarily maximize
social welfare, however, because when buyers recover less than their
expectation, the seller will breach too often. A court that required a
multiplier of one would cure the inefficient breach problem (assuming that damages could be proven in court). Low-valuing buyers
would exit the market, however, because they would be unwilling to
pay the price for a fully compensatory liquidated damage clause.
Their absence is an efficiency loss because the seller could have
served them at a price that equaled its cost. A court that contemplated raising the permissible multiplier therefore would face a
tradeoff between increasing efficiency respecting the breach decision
and decreasing efficiency respecting the trading decision. Whether
underliquidation is efficient, all in all, thus turns on the distribution of
buyer valuations in the relevant market: if too many low valuers exist,
then raising the multiplier would be a mistake.16 Courts, however,
seldom could observe these distributions, which may explain why they
ignore underliquidation in the absence of unconscionability.
2.3 Entry Deterrence7
Multipliers that exceed one are optimal for the contracting parties in this story, but the high multipliers can reduce social welfare.
The parties here are a seller with market power, a buyer, and a
potential entrant into the seller's market. If the outside firm does
enter, it and the seller will compete until the market price equals the
higher of the two firms' costs; as a result, the buyer could purchase at
the greater of the incumbent firm's costs or the entrant's costs. The
incumbent and the buyer are assumed to know the distribution of
costs from which the outside firm's actual costs are drawn, but not the

16. A similar problem exists in the law of seller's damages when a seller of standard goods
resells them at the contract price after breach. If the law awards the seller lost profits, buyers
will only breach when performance would be inefficient. When buyer valuations differ,
however, awarding the seller lost profits causes some low-valuing buyers to exit the market,
though the seller could profitably serve them. How this tradeoff between possible breach and
trading inefficiencies is best resolved is a difficult question. See Barry Adler & Alan Schwartz,
Revisiting the Lost Profits Puzzle, Mimeo (2002) (on file with authors).
17. The analysis here is based on Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier
to Entry, 77 AMER. ECON. REV. 388, 388-92 (1987). A similar model appears in Tai-Yeong
Chung, On the Social Optimality of LiquidatedDamage Clauses:An Economic Analysis, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 280, 284-89 (1992).
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actual costs. If the incumbent and the buyer do not contract, entry
thus is possible (by a low-cost outsider) but not certain.
The incumbent's best strategy is to collude with the buyer against
the potential entrant in order to force the entrant to make an offer to
the buyer to trade at a price that is below the incumbent's cost. This
will permit the incumbent seller and the buyer together to capture
profits from the entrant. To see how this can be done, suppose that
the seller and the buyer set the contractual damages at the incumbent's expectation interest. This will be the price p less the incumbent's costs c. Given these damages, there will be entry whenever the
outside firm's costs are below the incumbent's costs; the entrant will
bid to sell to the buyer at a price that is slightly below c. This offer is
profitable for the buyer to accept, even after paying the liquidated
damages of p - c to the incumbent. When the parties choose a compensatory damage measure, then, the seller receives her expectancy;
the buyer ultimately pays a sum that, including damages, is slightly
less than the contract price p; and the entrant essentially captures all
of the gains from entry.
This result maximizes social welfare because there is entry whenever the entrant can provide the good or service more cheaply than
the incumbent, but the result does not maximize the seller's and the
buyer's gains. When their contractual damage measure equals the
expectation, they are not charging a "price" for entry. To see how the
parties could do better, define an "entry tax" t as the excess of the
contract's liquidated damage measure above the seller's true expectancy. The tax thus is zero when the contract's damage multiplier
equals one. The parties, however, do better with a positive tax that
maximizes the product of the tax and the number of entrants who will
pay it. When t > 0, only firms with costs less than c - t will enter. A
liquidated damage clause with a multiplier that exceeds one thus
permits entry only by very low-cost firms. If there is entry, the seller
collects the tax-from the excessive liquidated damages-and the
buyer will pay a total sum that is less than the contract price p, just as
before.18 And if entry is deterred, the seller shares the monopoly rent

18. In order to induce the buyer to breach its contract with the incumbent, the entrant must
offer the buyer a price that is sufficiently low so that the buyer can pay liquidated damages to
the seller and still do at least as well as he would have done had he complied with the initial
contract. The larger the liquidated damages, the lower must be the entrant's offer and thus the
lower must be the entrant's costs to make entry profitable for it.
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with the buyer by charging a price that is less than the buyer's valuation.19

The contract between the incumbent and the buyer again is efficient for the parties: the seller does better with a multiplier that

exceeds one, and the buyer does at least as well under the contract as
he would do without a contract.

Here, however, the contract is

clearly inefficient. The high multiplier permits entry only by firms
with costs that are low enough to permit them to pay the tax and still
earn a profit. Firms with costs higher than this, but still below the
entrant's costs, would stay out. The high multiplier thus generates

two inefficiencies: either entry deterrence of more efficient firms, or
entry delay while the outsider waits for the contract with the buyer to
end.2 0

2.4 Summary
When parties are symmetrically informed about the relevant
economic parameters but the court cannot observe realized valuations, a liquidated damage clause serves two functions: to permit the
performing party to take optimal precautions against the possibility of
breach, and to insure the buyer. A multiplier of one serves these
functions efficiently; any other multiplier would reduce welfare. In
another class of model, the seller has market power, but cannot
observe buyer valuations. The only relevant economic decision for
efficiency purposes is whether the seller should perform or breach,
but the seller also wants to charge prices that partly reflect the value
buyers put on performance. Here, the parties do best with multipliers
of one or less. The resultant contracts sometimes are inefficient all in
all, but it is very difficult for courts to know just when. In the final
class of model, a seller with monopoly power wants to deter entry,
which she does by choosing a multiplier that exceeds one in her
19. A "monopoly rent" is the difference between the highest price the monopolist could
charge and the competitive price.
20. Kathryn E. Spier & Michael D. Whinston, On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated
Damagesfor Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers,Reliance and Renegotiation, 46 RAND J. ECON.
180, 183-86, 195-96 (1995), use a model that is similar to Aghion and Bolton, supra note 17, but
they permit the seller to invest to increase the surplus in her deal with the buyer, and they also
permit the parties to renegotiate costlessly. Their paper shows that renegotiation can undo the
benefits to the buyer and the incumbent seller of high liquidated damages. The parties in their
model thus will use a liquidated damage clause that equals the buyer's expectation. The seller,
however, will overinvest to increase the expectation. This again will create a tax on entry and
therefore is inefficient. Note that in the Spier & Whinston model, a damage multiplier of one
actually is associated with an inefficient contract. Spier & Whinston, supra at 186.
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contracts with market buyers. The takeaway from these models is
that contractual damage multipliers that equal or fall below one likely
are efficient, but multipliers that exceed one are inefficient.
III. MODERN INVESTMENT MODELS
3.1 Introduction
In the early models, parties contracted to exclude entry, to facilitate price discrimination, or to insure. Parties, however, commonly
write contracts to encourage investment in the subject matter of the
deal. When parties have an investment motive, it often will be
efficient for them to choose damage multipliers that exceed one.
To begin to understand this choice, it will be helpful to set out an
investment taxonomy and then to review the effect of the standard
contract remedies on investment. Investment can be either "self" or
"cooperative."2 1 A seller's self-investment would reduce her own
costs; a buyer's self-investment would increase the buyer's value for
the contractual performance. A cooperative investment occurs when
the seller takes an action that may increase the buyer's valuation, or
the buyer takes an action that may reduce the seller's costs.
We begin with self-investment and consider the effect of damage
multipliers that equal one on the parties' incentives. Suppose that the
buyer can make an investment that will increase its valuation only if
the parties trade. If trade turns out to be inefficient-the seller's
production cost would exceed the buyer's value-the investment will
have been wasted. The buyer, in choosing an investment level, thus
should consider the return on the investment in states of the world in
which the parties trade-positive-and the return on the investment
in states of the world in which the parties do not trade-zero. Contract law, however, awards the buyer the difference between the
buyer's valuation given his investment and the price when the parties
do not trade; the buyer thus is fully insured against lost valuations
21. We consider investments that are not fully redeployable. For example, the seller may
invest in standard steel rods to make a product for the buyer. If the buyer breaches before
production begins, the investment will be redeployable; the seller can sell the rods. If the buyer
breaches after the rods have been transformed in a production process, the investment is not
fully redeployable; the rods may bring only their scrap value on resale. Investments in human
capital-learning how best to do the deal at issue -also are not fully redeployable, and may not
be redeployable at all. Nonredeployable investments are sometimes called "relation specific
investments" or "sunk costs."
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regardless of the investment level he chose. Therefore, the buyer will
22
invest too much.
This analysis appears to suggest an efficiency role for underliquidation. The parties can write a damage. measure that pays the buyer
the difference between the value performance would have had if the
buyer invested efficiently, and the contract price. 23 This sum will be
less than the difference between the buyer's valuation and the price if
the buyer overinvested. To be sure, in equilibrium the buyer will
invest efficiently so l will turn out to equal one. The difficulty
instead is that the seller ex ante may not know the buyer's production
function-the relation between investment level and value; and often
neither the seller nor the court could observe the investment level
that the buyer actually chose. The existence of asymmetric information thus would create moral hazard: the buyer will overinvest but
claim that he invested efficiently. Choosing a low damage multiplier,
therefore, cannot solve the overinvestment problem.
3.2 Efficient One-Sided Self-Investment with Penalties
The inefficiency in the model just sketched exists because the victim of breach-the buyer-did not control the breach decision;
instead, the seller chose whether to breach or to pay damages. To see
why control matters, recall that g is the expectation interest and
denote the surplus under a contract as S; the surplus is the sum of the
parties' profits. The breaching party thus receives S - g, the surplus
that remains after compensating the victim. Suppose that this party
could make a self-investment. The investment would benefit her by
increasing the total surplus, but the investment (being self) would not
directly affect the victim's return g. The breaching party thus would
be the full residual claimant so she will make all investments whose
return exceeds the cost.
This insight underlies Aaron Edlin's model 24 in which he shows
that parties can induce efficient self-investment under contracts that
implicitly assign the breach decision to the investor. To see how,

22. William P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and DamageMeasures for Breach of Contract,
15 RAND J. ECON. 39, 41-43, 47 (1984); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of
Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 472 (1980).
23. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution,73
CAL. L. REV. 1, 11-19 (1985).
24. Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contractsand Up-FrontPayments: Efficient Investment Under
Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 98, 104-11 (1996).
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suppose that it is the seller who can invest to reduce costs. The
optimal contract has two features: (a) the ex post transaction price is
very low, so the buyer will want to trade; (b) to induce the seller to
deal, the buyer must make a large up-front payment. These features
make the seller the likely contract breacher. If the seller does breach,
she must pay the buyer's expectation-the difference between his
valuation and the price. This sum is unaffected by the seller's investment behavior. As a consequence, the seller realizes a positive return
on her investment in cost reduction only when the parties trade. And
because the parties trade just when trade is efficient, the seller
realizes a return on her investment just when it is socially efficient for
her to invest. The combination of a low transaction price and a large
up-front payment, by allocating the breach decision to the investing
party, thus cures the overinvestment problem that protecting the
expectation interest would otherwise create.
These contracts will sometimes require implicit penalties. In order to see why, consider an extreme case in which the buyer pays the
full price up-front. It then turns out that his value for the performance is less than the total sum he is required to pay (e.g., he finds a
better supplier). The buyer cancels the order after the seller invests
but before she begins production. The seller's expectation would be
her profit; hence, to avoid overcompensation the seller should return
that portion of the up-front payment that equals the production cost
that the breach saved her from incurring. Requiring the seller to
return part of the up-front payment, however, restores her incentive
to overinvest. This is because the greater the investment in cost
reduction that the seller makes, the larger is her expected profit (the
difference between price and cost), and the smaller is the portion of
the down payment the seller would have to return. To avoid overinvestment, the seller thus should be permitted to keep the entire upfront payment, regardless of when the buyer cancels. Then the buyer
will not cancel and the seller will not overinvest. Note that if the
seller can retain the up-front payment whether she produces the
goods or not, she may be overcompensated. The optimal contract
thus contains an implicit damage multiplier that can exceed one.
Edlin therefore shows that penalties sometimes are necessary to
induce efficient investment."

25. The complexity of the investment decision, makes no difference in this model so long as
the investor is the full residual claimant.
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26
3.3 Efficient Two-Sided Self-Investment with Penalties

We consider two additional complexities in this section: (a) now
both parties to the contract may be able to make investments that will
reduce cost or increase value; (b) breach is only one form of contract
modification; sometimes it will turn out to be efficient to deviate from
the contract quantity. We next construct an example in which it is
possible to trade a variable quantity and investment is two-sided. The
parties can renegotiate to the efficient ex post quantity; the question is
whether in this setting both parties can be given efficient incentives to
invest. The answer is not without penalties. We first explain why
parties will not invest efficiently under standard contract remedies
(when the damage multiplier equals one), and then we show that
penalties will improve incentives.
In the example, American Airlines is negotiating with Boeing for
the purchase of a new airliner. The lead time for delivery of planes is
several years, so there is uncertainty as to the exact number of planes
American will turn out to want. The number is a function of future
economic conditions, the competitiveness of possible European and
Brazilian entrants, and the like. American believes that it will need
150 planes with probability of and 50 planes with probability of ;
the expected ex post demand thus is 100 planes. This is the contract
quantity. Regarding investment, Boeing can take actions-buying
particular equipment, say-that will lower the production cost per
plane by $100,000, exclusive of the investment expense. Similarly,
American can invest in advertising, reconfiguring terminals, and
training employees; these investments will add $100,000 to the value
of each plane actually purchased, exclusive of investment cost. As
indicated above, the parties will renegotiate to trade the efficient
number of planes, if that number turns out to differ from the contract
quantity of 100.
We first focus on Boeing's incentives. The expected quantity is
100, so if Boeing invests, there will be an expected gross savings of
100 x $100,000 = $10 million. We assume that the investment cost is
less and begin with the case when Boeing invests and it later is
efficient to trade 150 planes. The joint gain from renegotiating the
contract to trade the efficient ex post quantity is denoted s; the total
renegotiation surplus thus is s + (50 x $100,000) = s + $5 million. We
26. The following is based on Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard
Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment, 86 AMER. ECON. REV. 478 (1996).
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assume that each party will realize one-half of this in their bargaining
game, so each party's payoff is s12 + $2.5 million. If Boeing had not
invested, the renegotiation surplus would have been just s. Therefore, the investment generated an additional $5 million in cost reduction (because 50 more planes were traded), but American captures
half of this. The difference between the additional value Boeing
produced and its investment return is termed a "holdup tax." The tax
actually is a wedge between the social return to investment-$5
million-and the investing party's private return-$2.5 million; hence,
Boeing has an incentive to underinvest. And by a similar argument,
American would have to split with Boeing the additional $5 million in
value its preparations made possible (again because 50 more planes
are traded); hence, it too would have an incentive to underinvest.
Assume now that it turns out to be efficient to trade only 50
planes. Let Boeing breach the contract and deliver only 50 planes,
and also let it compensate American for its lost expectation (the
difference between the value and the price on the 50 undelivered
planes). American, therefore, will be given an incentive to overinvest. It can increase its return by $100,000 per plane for the contract
quantity of 100 planes, while the true economic return on its investment was only $5 million (because only 50 planes actually were
traded). We denote the additional $5 million return to American as a
"breach subsidy." American thus pays a holdup tax when it is efficient to trade more than the contract quantity and receives a breach
subsidy when it is efficient to trade less than the contract quantity.
These at least partly balance out in expectation, so American will
invest roughly efficiently. However, while Boeing pays a holdup tax
when it is efficient to trade 150 planes, it does not get a breach
subsidy when it is efficient to trade 50 planes. Recall from the
previous section that the breacher receives just the social return from
its investment. Therefore, Boeing expects to receive nothing to
balance against the holdup tax it could have to pay, and it responds by
underinvesting with certainty.
As it happens, when the remedy is expectation damages, there is
no contract that can give both parties the incentive to invest efficiently. Boeing could be given efficient incentives if the contract
required it to deliver 150 planes. Then it would face only breach
contingencies; Boeing, that is, would breach whenever it turned out to
be efficient to trade less than 150 planes, so it would realize a return
on its investment in cost reduction only for quantities that turned out
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to be efficient to trade. Hence, it would invest efficiently, just as in
the one-sided investment case. American, on the other hand, will
invest to increase value for 150 planes because it is guaranteed the
difference between the value and the price for 150 planes. American
thus receives a breach subsidy but never pays a holdup tax and so it
will overinvest. Efficient investment incentives would be restored for
American by lowering the contract quantity (to 83 in this example).
Lowering the contract quantity, however, would worsen Boeing's
incentives.
Contractual penalties respond efficiently to this skew in incentives that the expectation interest would otherwise create. To see
why, let the contract require American to pay a large penalty to
Boeing if it takes less than 100 planes, and consider the case when it
would be efficient to trade only 50 planes. In this circumstance,
American would either have to accept the inefficient contract quantity of 100 or bribe Boeing not to enforce the penalty. When a
renegotiation surplus exists, both parties do better renegotiating;
hence, Boeing would agree to produce the lesser quantity rather than
use the threat of the penalty to require American to perform under
the contract. Boeing's gain from renegotiation would be sf2. The
penalty thus permits Boeing to expect to receive a breach subsidy in
the low-demand state that, in expectation, will balance out the holdup
tax it must pay in the high-demand state. Boeing thus will invest
more efficiently. The penalty also imposes a holdup tax of sf2 on
American when demand turns out to be low. Imposing a penalty on
Boeing in the high-demand state if it breached to demand that
American take 150 planes, by the same logic, would eventuate in a
renegotiation that would give a breach subsidy to American. This
subsidy would balance out the holdup tax so American too would be
induced to invest efficiently. Penalties thus are necessary for creating
efficient investment incentives in the two-sided self-investment case.
Specific performance also would improve investment incentives.
But here an award of specific performance is not justifiable on the
traditional ground that the remedy prevents inefficient breach when
valuations are unverifiable. Courts likely would not grant specific
performance in this illustration because valuations are verifiable. The
planes have a market price and thus the traditional remedies would
prevent breach when performance would be efficient. Specific
performance instead is justifiable here because it functions in the
same way that a monetary penalty does; when the remedy is avail-
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able, the performing party will renegotiate in order not to incur a
large loss. 27 And as just shown, when parties anticipate how renego28
tiation distributes surplus, their incentives to invest are improved.
3.4 Cooperative Investment under Mechanism Design
Cooperative investment can be impossible to induce without

penalties, given the ability of parties to renegotiate after uncertainty
is resolved. We will first show this with a simple example29 and then
show how an appropriately designed contract in connection with
penalties can increase efficiency. In the example, the parties agree to
trade one unit of a good at time to. The good can turn out to have two
values, vh = 21 and v, = 15. These values are not verifiable. At time t',
the seller can make an investment that will increase the likelihood
that the value turns out to be high. 0 The investment is not observable, and so is noncontractible. At time t 2, the parties trade. The
investment cost c is assumed to be zero. Therefore, it will be efficient

to trade whatever the realized value turns out to be.
An efficient contract would have two prices, one for the high
value and one for the low. There would be efficient investment if the
contract permitted the seller at t 2 to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer at
the prices Ph = 21 and p, = 15. These prices give the seller all of the
realized surplus, so she will invest efficiently. 31 The difficulty is that
the buyer will reject the take-it-or-leave-it offer. Since there is
surplus to share, the parties will renegotiate. The surplus is 21 in the
high-value state (vh - c) and 15 in the low-value state (v, - c). Assum27. The specific performance remedy, recall, implies a damage multiplier that exceeds one.
See supra Section 1.1.
28. We note here an additional role for penalties when, as sometimes happens, courts
cannot observe whether the seller actually performed the contract. In these cases, what the
buyer gets is unsatisfactory, but the cause of failure could be the seller's poor performance or
some other factor. If the actual cause is difficult to discern, the probability that the seller will be
held liable when it breaches falls to below one. Sellers will respond by breaching too often. A
penalty that is imposed when a poor performance actually is traced to the seller's behavior is
necessary to restore efficient incentives. See Aaron S. Edlin & Benjamin E. Hermalin, Contract
Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 395 , 404-09 (2000);
AARON S. EDLIN & BENJAMIN E. HERMALIN, CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION IN AGENCY
PROBLEMS 26-31, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6086, 1997), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6068.
29. The example is drawn from Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, Cooperative
Investments and the Value of Contracting,89 AM. ECON. REV. 125, 128-29 (1999).
30. The investment is cooperative because the seller is investing to increase the buyer's
value.
31. The contract also would require the seller to make an up-front payment to the buyer to
induce him to agree.
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ing that the parties share surplus equally, the prices the seller actually
expects to receive under the contract thus are Ph(r) = 10.5 and P,(r) = 7.5.
These prices, however, equal the prices the seller would charge if
there were no contract and she offered the finished product to the
buyer. The parties would then split the gains from trade (21 or 15), so
the seller again would receive 10.5 or 7.5. Notice that the difference
between the seller's return in the high- and low-value states when
there is no contract is 3; in contrast, the social return is 6 = (21 - 15).
Investment incentives with no contract, therefore, are likely to be
inefficient. Contracts can improve investment incentives only if they
can create wider wedges between the seller's payoffs in the two states
than the seller would receive without a contract. The example
suggests, and it can be proved, that simple two-price contracts seldom
32
could do this.
The parties, however, could write a "mechanism contract" that
would achieve efficiency, provided that penalties are enforceable and
that parties can commit to playing the mechanism rather than deviating from its outcome. 33 The contract would contain the list of possible
quantities to trade-in this example, one-and a set of prices to
match the possible values that could be realized-here Ph = 21 and p,
= 15. The contract also would require the parties to play a game of
the following form after the seller invests and the parties observe the
realized quality. The buyer can announce that the value is vh or v,. If
the buyer's announcement is vh, the game ends and the parties trade
the product at the price of 21. If the buyer announces v, the seller
can agree or disagree. If the seller agrees, the game ends and the
parties trade the product at 15. If the seller disagrees, the buyer pays
a huge penalty to the court. The court next offers the buyer a choice:
to buy the product at 21 or to receive nothing and pay the seller 5.99.
If the product actually has a low value, then it is worth 15 so the buyer
would lose 6 by paying 21 for it; the buyer would prefer to receive
nothing and pay 5.99. Note that when the buyer makes this choice, he
32. Making renegotiation costly might help but it is difficult for parties to control the cost
of renegotiation.
33. The following is based on Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies and
Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 83 (1999), and John Moore & Rafael Repullo,
Subgame Perfect Implementation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 1191 (1988). See also Oliver Hart & John
Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts,66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115 (1999). Earlier papers
that also sought to induce efficient investment partly by the use of penalties include Philippe
Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Rey, Renegotiation Design With Unverifiable
Information, 62 ECONOMETRICA 257 (1994), and W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts,83 AMER. ECON. REV. 811 (1993).
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shows that the product's value actually is low, thereby revealing that
the seller's challenge was false. The seller must then pay a huge
penalty to the court.
The parties will tell the truth in the equilibrium of this game.
The seller knows that if the buyer truthfully announces a value of 15
and she challenges him, the buyer's later action will reveal the falsity
of the challenge; the seller would then have to pay a large penalty. If,
on the other hand, the buyer falsely announces a value of 15, the
seller will challenge in order to receive 21. Hence, if the seller has
occasion to make an announcement, her announcement will be
truthful. The buyer knows that if the true value is Vh and he announces that the value is v1, the seller will challenge him, and he
would then have to pay a large penalty. Hence, the buyer will not
shade down the value. The buyer also will not announce 21 if the
value is 15; this announcement would lose him 6, and a true announcement would not be challenged. Both parties thus will make
truthful announcements regarding the product's quality. In consequence, the seller will anticipate that the price wedge between the
two possible qualities will be 6, which is greater than the no contract
wedge and equals the true difference. Therefore, she will invest
efficiently.
Mechanisms of this type seem not to be seen for three reasons.
First, they often appear costly for parties to create in relation to the
gains.3 4 Second, the penalties the mechanisms require are not enforceable. 35 Third, since parties are symmetrically informed ex post,
and the mechanisms require ex post inefficient actions, parties have
an incentive to renegotiate out of their mechanism. Analysts suggest
that the renegotiation problem can be solved by a three-party
scheme. Under such a scheme, the contract parties could agree ex
ante to pay a large penalty to an unimpeachable third party if they
renegotiate. If the third party would enforce this agreement, renegotiation would be deterred. The third party scheme may not be
collusion proof, however. The contract parties have an incentive to
34. See ALAN SCHWARTZ & JOEL WATSON, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF COSTLY
CONTRACTING, (U.C. San Diego Dept. of Econ., Discussion Paper 2001-21, 2003), at
http://www.ucsd.edu/papers/2001-21.pdf.
35. A possible additional reason is that real courts are unlikely to play the role that
mechanism contracts assign to them. Parties could choose tractable arbitrators, however, if
courts would enforce the arbitration awards. Since these could contain penalties, the arbitration
solution today is not available. A thoughtful argument that efficiency would be enhanced if
courts did participate in mechanism schemes is Richard R. W. Brooks, Simple Rules for Simple
Courts, 13-19 (Nov. 2001), at http://lawweb.usc.edu/cleo/conferences/md/brooks.pdf.
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bribe the third party to permit them to renegotiate. The third party
would do better accepting the bribe than it would do by credibly
threatening to enforce the scheme, for if the threat did induce the
contract parties to adhere to the mechanism, the third party would
receive nothing. This objection may not be telling, though, because
third parties who want to be repeat enforcers or who otherwise have a
stake in their reputations could resist the temptation to collude.
We do not need to take a position on the possible efficacy of
these schemes. A court will see a "three-party case" only when a
contract enforcer has resisted the temptation to collude. Courts
should stand ready to enforce the penalties that a third party seeks in
such a case because the anticipation of this judicial action is a precondition to the success of mechanism design solutions at inducing
efficient cooperative investment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Essay has shown the following:
(i) Damage multipliers that are less than one can be
(a) Inefficient when the seller offers the buyer a contract that the
buyer would reject were he better informed or more
sophisticated, or
(b) Efficient when a party would otherwise overinvest
(Cooter); when both parties could take precautions against
breach (Rea); or when the seller is screening over buyers
whose valuations are not observable (Stole; Schwartz).
(ii) Damage multipliers that equal one can be
(a) Inefficient when the seller is overinvesting to deter entry
(Spier & Whinston), or
(b) Efficient when the buyer is insuring with his seller (Goetz
& Scott), when only one party can reduce the probability of
breach (Goetz & Scott; Rea) and when the seller is screening
over buyers.
(iii) Damage multipliers that exceed one can be
(a) Inefficient when a seller with monopoly power is using them
to deter entry and when a seller is offering an exploitive
contract that a well-informed or sophisticated buyer would
refuse; or
(b) Efficient when breaches are difficult to detect (Edlin &
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Hermalin) and when parties deliberately are using penalties
to induce efficient relation specific investment (e.g., Edlin,
Edlin & Reichelstein, Hart & Moore; Maskin &
Tirole).
Multipliers of any size thus can be efficient or inefficient, depending on the parties' circumstances and the purposes that the
parties intended the multiplier to serve. The liquidated damage rules
permit multipliers that are one or less in expectation unless there is
unconscionability, but prohibit multipliers that exceed one whether
there is unconscionability or not. The latter branch of the rules
should be repealed because some multipliers that exceed one are
efficient.
It will be helpful, in understanding the claim we actually make, to
consider the defenses that could be raised in actions that involve
liquidated damage clauses.
A. a < 1: The promisee would sue, not to enforce the liquidated
damage clause, but for expectation damages. Since multipliers less
than one likely are efficient, a promisor defense that the promisee is
limited to the damages specified in the contract should prevail unless
the undercompensatory clause was procured through fraud, duress, or
unconscionability.
B. cc = 1: Compensatory liquidated damage clauses are enforceable today, but a promisor should be permitted to defend-to prevent
enforcement of the clause-on the ground that the clause is part of a
36
scheme to deter entry.
C. a > 1: Under current law, there are three defenses to a suit to
enforce a penalty clause:
(i) The penalty term was procured through fraud, duress, or
unconscionability.
(ii) The penalty term is in restraint of trade because it is an
integral part of a scheme to deter entry.
(iii) The penalty term should not be enforced because, and only
because, it is a penalty.
On our argument, the first two of these defenses should continue
to be permitted but the third should be banned. When fraud and the
like are ruled out, parties would adopt a penalty term either to deter
entry or to encourage relation specific investment. If the promisor

36. See Spier & Whinston, supra note 20, at 189.

54

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 78:33

cannot establish a restraint of trade, the term thus should be enforced
because it is efficient.
To be concrete, then, we argue only, but importantly, that U.C.C.
§ 2-718 and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 should
be repealed.

